The Identity of Meaning - 05

We begin this series with the early essay which gives its name to this column - written in 1959.    (Fifth of six sections)

The Function of Principle

     The theme of this search, by reason of the vastness of the problem of meaning, is an investigation which hopes to discover the principle that has collective jurisdiction, not over the particular of a specific existence, but over the general content of all things for which the all-inclusive name “meaning” has been established as a mutual base. Thus I hold it to be necessary to examine the nature of principle itself, in the expectation of at least partially revealing its structure.

      I can possibly demonstrate the function of principle illustratively, by discussing the problem of comparison, to show how principles become actively engaged in ordering the world of thought as well as physical being.
 

     For good reason we are wont to see meaning between existences which are involved in comparative measuring. Partners in comparison are items of the same kind which, however, differ in the amount or degree of their same traits. Therefore, a comparison of significantly dissimilar things may only be effected if we invent for them a general and collective term and impose it as the common denominator.

     The comparative function is probably best exemplified by selecting adjectives which already have comparative significance in linguistic use. I propose the antonyms “large” and “small,” with the intent to seek out and make evident the nature of the intellectual act whose consequence is comparison.

     Assuming, as items of a wholly arbitrary collection, an egg, a chair, and a tank, which have no features in common except physical size in different degrees of magnitude, we reduce the identity of each by terming them all “objects,” and make them thereby available for comparison.

     The chair, seen merely as an object of size, is unquestionably larger than the egg, quite as certainly as it is smaller than the tank. And it does not seem possible that any of these items might relate by exerting an influence upon or making a contribution to any other.

     Relation, so it appears, in this random assortment of things, could only be the accidental result of an atypical selection, and it would then not be achieved by reason or under the condition of a comparison in size, but would be brought about by a fluke of circumstance.

     To place ourselves in a position to compare egg, chair, and tank, we have determined to ignore their respective identities  by naming them collectively objects, and apparently have deprived them simultaneously of all power to contribute meaning. They have seemingly retained nothing but an ability to displace amounts of space by physical bulk. And their unequal sizes are their only visible contribution to each other.

     Yet, a difference in size can be as potent a contribution of one object to the other as that of wheels and chassis reaching the status of carriage, by being made to jointly fulfill their possibilities in practical reality. For, in their dissimilar properties, those two were capable of supplying the exact needs that left each short of the identity they assumed in collaboration.

     Thus, unequal magnitudes are the essential supplements in the assertion of the new identity, namely, size comparison. With these differing sizes as the granted prerequisite, the mind of man must cooperate to the extent of qualifying – without loss of inherent meaning – egg, chair and tank, by exploiting the tolerance which their identity owns. This flexibility permits the generalization that designates them simply as objects and makes them available for the act of comparison.

      As largeness or smallness will forever change location from one object to the other when one surpasses another in either quality, we recognize that largeness, bound to the visible object, is always excelled by another still larger that reduces the first to smallness.
From this we infer that only an infinite, all-inclusive vastness of magnitude may claim “largeness,” as also solely the dimensionless, infinitely tiny point in space cannot be surpassed in “smallness.”

     Only incomprehensible infinity possesses these designations of extremes in magnitude without either question or challenge. But the mind of the human being needs an instrument –  and finds it in comparison –  which will reduce the infinitely large and small to the dimensions of his intellect or even physical mass. In expressing a thing as “large” or “small,” we state in reality that it is larger or smaller than a certain point of reference in the environment, and impose thereby the measure of our own experience.
 

     The generalization, in which I have gathered nouns of very unequal meaning by collectively calling them objects, provides a guiding hint how the nature of principle can be revealed. The particular condition which is shared and recognized as identical in otherwise most dissimilar items is precisely the factor that provides their collective name and imposes sameness, under the identity of this name only, upon all relative activities carried on in terms of that general definition.

     In this manner, the collective and general principle governs diverse things in the exact areas that are recognizable as common ground. So, egg, chair and tank under the principle of comparison assume a common denominator in the designation “object” and act the same, by all offering their physical size to be measured against each other and also in contrasting reference to environmental experience. In this way, the principle of comparison extends to man the most precious gift of allowing him to comprehend his world in terms of proportions that he can himself establish in accord with his limitations.

     Principle, by definition, requires difference in the identities that it contains within one law. As well it requires that, pertaining to these differences, an area of overlap of function is found where those diversities act identically and as equals. Since principle unifies differences under one jurisdiction, it cannot therefore reveal itself in things whose identity is the same in all respects.

     Thus, recognition of principle is the instrument of comprehensive understanding. For it makes huge complications explicable by concentratedly simplifying them. By virtue of this reduction, they become manageable for the mind.